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By Derek Weller 9
In 1973, Congress enacted the Endangered Species
Act (ESA or the Act)' to reverse the trend toward
species extinction resulting from -economic growth
and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation "2 In the ESA, Congress created a
powerful statutory framework for the protection and
conservation of endangered and threatened species
and the ecosystems upon which they depend Its strin-
gent provisions were intended to apply across the
board, to all private and governmental activity, Section
9 of the Act, the general take prohibition, makes it
unlawful for any private, state, or federal entity to "take"
an endangered or threatened species 3 In addition, sec-
tion 7 imposes a number of additional obligations on
all federal agencies intended to insure that federal gov-
ernmental activity does not jeopardize the continued
existence of threatened and endangered species 4
At the heart of the ESA's protective measures, sec-
tion 7(a)(2) provides that,
lelach Iflederal agency shall, in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary
insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this
section referred to as an "agency action") is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modifi-
cation of habitat of such species which is deter-
mined to be critical 5
Section 7(a)(2) imposes two mandatory obligations on
all federal agencies, one substantive and one procedur-
al. The substantive mandate of section 71a)12j requires
agencies to "insure" that its actions are "not likely to
'- I D I999. Un'ersity of Cahfomra Hasttngs Coilege of the
Law. B A 1993. University of California, D'.LS Th:ns to Professors
Reuel Schiller and Brian E Gray for their guld3r:e and instrucLtzn
To my wife and family, thanks for your unending support
I Endangered SpeciesActiESAJ of 1973 16 USC , 1531-
1544 (1994)
2 Id § 1531aji!J
3 ld § 1538taJIiiiBj-iCi Take" is defined as 'to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot wound kill, trap, capture, or collectr or
to attempt to engage in such conduct 'I d § 15321191
4 Id § 15361ail21
5 Id
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jeopardize the continued existence" of any
threatened or endangered species or "result in
the destruction or adverse modification" of crit-
ical habitat.6 To facilitate agency compliance
with the substantive mandate, section 7(a)(2)
also includes a procedural mandate requiring
all federal agencies to consult with the Fish &
Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively, the
Service) to identify both the effects of a pro-
posed agency action on threatened or endan-
gered species and reasonable alternatives that
may be employed by the agency to avoid jeop-
ardizing those species. 7
For any of section 7(a)(2)'s mandates to
apply to a given agency activity, the activity
must fall within the definition of "agency
action" under section 7(a)(2). "Agency action"
is defined as "any action authorized, funded or
carried out" by a federal agency.8 in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,9 the United States
Supreme Court concluded that "[olne would be
hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer" and that the
language "admits of no exception." The Court
based its conclusion on a plain reading of the
statutory language, which it found further sup-
ported by the legislative history and underlying
purposes of the ESA.' 0 The Court also conclud-
ed that "the legislative history undergirding
section 7 reveals an explicit congressional
decision to require agencies to afford first pri-
ority to the declared national policy of saving
endangered species" and "to give endangered
species priority over the 'primary missions' of
federal agencies."'I
Congress subsequently amended the ESA
in response to the Hill decision, confirming the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 7 as
a crosscutting provision intended to impose
6. See id.
7 Id. § 1536(a)(4), 1536(b)(4).
8. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
9. 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1973) (holding that section 7
of the ESA required the Court to enioin the operation of a
nearly completed federal dam prolect, authorized prior to
the enactment of the ESA, where the ongoing operation of
the project would destroy the habitat of the endangered
snail darter).
obligations that are in addition to, and with
priority over, other federal agency obliga-
tions. 12 Accordingly, federal courts have inter-
preted the scope of "agency action" under sec-
tion 7(a)(2) broadly. 13 The Service's joint regu-
lations are also in accord with the above
authorities with respect to the definition of
"action." Section 402.02 of the joint regulations
defines "action" as "all activities or programs of
any kind authorized, funded or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Iflederal agencies in the
United States or upon the high seas."14
Based on the plain language of section
7(a)(2), Congress' underlying intent and pur-
pose, the Supreme Court's findings, and the
Service's own definition of "action," it seems
clear that "agency action," trigger ng the man-
dates of section 7(a)(2), includes. "any action
authorized, funded or carried out" by federal
agencies with no exceptions. The Service's
joint regulations interpreting the applicability
of section 7, however, do provide an exception
to section 7(a)(2)'s mandates. Se'ction 402.03
of the joint regulations provides that "Islection
7 and the requirements of this Part apply to all
actions in which there is discretionary Iflederal
involvement or control '"i5 A number of judicial
opinions have relied on section 402.03 to find
agency action that would otherwise fall within
the scope of section 7(a)(2) to be exempt as
nondiscretionary agency action. 6 Thus, sec-
tion 402.03 has in effect redefined the scope of
"agency action" subject to section 7(a)(2)'s
mandates to exclude agency actiol that can be
deemed nondiscretionary. Moreover, since an
agency's discretionary authority is defined by
its operative statute, the exclusion of nondis-
cretionary agency action from section 7(a)(2)'s
mandates gives the agency's obligations under
its operative statute greater priority over the
10. See id. at 174-93.
i. Id. at 185.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91
13. See infra note 62,
14. 50 C,FR. § 402,02 (1998) (emphasis added)
15. Id. § 402.03 (emphasis added)
16. See infra Part III
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mandates of section 7(a)(2). This is clearly
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that Congress intended for agencies "to
give endangered species priority over the 'pri-
mary missions' of federal agencies." 17
The nondiscretionary element created by
section 402.03 does not appear in the statutory
language of the ESA, its legislative history, or
any judicial interpretations of the scope of sec-
tion 7(a)(2), other than those relying on section
402.03 itself. In addition, the term "discre-
tionary" did not appear in the proposed rule-
making that preceded the publication of the
final rule promulgating section 402.03. Rather, it
was inserted into the regulatory language and
published as a final rule without any opportuni-
ty for public discussion or comment concerning
the change. Also, no explanation for the inser-
tion of this term was provided in the final rule.
This failure on the part of the Service to provide
for notice and comment and to publish a state-
ment of the basis and purpose for amending
section 402.03 violated the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).i8
Given that section 402.03 creates an excep-
tion to a statutory provision that has been inter-
preted as having no exception, and given that it
was promulgated in violation of the APA, a close
examination of the meaning, effect and validity
of section 402.03 should be conducted. This
Note conducts such an analysis. Part If sets
forth a brief summary of the provisions of the
ESA and how "agency action" under section
7(a)(2) has been defined and interpreted. Part Ill
looks at the judicial opinions applying section
402.03 and concludes that section 402.03 has
indeed changed the analysis courts employ to
determine whether section 7(a)(2) applies to a
given agency action. Part IV details the APA vio-
lations implicated by the Service's promulga-
tion of section 402.03. Part V inquires into the
17. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 US. 153, 185
(1978).
18. Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U S C
§ 500-596 (1994).
19. 16 U.S.C § 1531(a)(l)-[2) (1994),
20. Id. § 1531(a)(3).
2i. 437 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
reasonableness of the Service's interpretation of
the applicability of section 7(a)(2). Part VI then
examines whether in the absence of section
402.03 the ludicial opinions relying on it would
have come out differently
11. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
A. Statutory Framework
In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA in
response to mounting evidence that many
species of plant and animal life have been ren-
dered extinct, endangered or threatened -as a
consequence of economic growth and develop-
ment untempered by adequate concern and
conservation " Recognizing the "esthetic, eco-
logical, educational, historical, recreational,
and scientific value lof these speciesl to the
Nation and its people," Congress created in the
ESA a powerful and stringent statutory frame-
work for the protection of endangered and
threatened species 20 By far the most compre-
hensive legislative effort to date for the protec-
tion of species, the ESA represents a conscious
congressional decision to give endangered and
threatened species the utmost protection, This
is clear from Congress' approval of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hill, which concluded that
the "the plain intent of Congress in enacting
Ithe ESAI was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost "21 In
addition, with respect to federal government
activities, the Supreme Court found that
Congress intended "to give endangered species
priority over the 'primary mission' of federal
agencies "22
The regulatory structure of the ESA provides
for the protection of endangered and threat-
ened species on a species by species and pro-
lect by project basis 23 A species comes within
the protections of the ESA when, pursuant to
22 Id at 185
23 An endangered species is one which "is in dan-
gerof extnctton 16 U SC § i532f6) 11994i A threatened
species is one which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future' id § 15321201
'Species' includes -any subspecies of fish or wildlife or
plants, and any distinct population segment of any
species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds
when mature' Id § 1532116)
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section 4, it is "listed" as endangered or threat-
ened,24 and its critical habitat is designated.2 5
Species are listed by the FWS or the NMFS, the
two federal agencies charged with administer-
ing the ESA.
Once a species has been listed, a number
of provisions providing for its protection are
triggered. One of the most significant protec-
tions afforded a species under the ESA is found
in the general take prohibition. Section 9 pro-
hibits the "taking"26 by any private, state, feder-
al or foreign entity27 of any species of fish or
wildlife that has been listed as endangered.2 8
In addition, the section 9 take prohibition has
been applied to most threatened species of
fish and wildlife under regulations promulgat-
ed by the Service pursuant to section
9(a)(1)(G). 2 9 Listed plant species are governed
by section 9(a)(2), prohibiting the removal,
damage, or destruction of listed endangered
plant species.3 0 A violation of section 9 sub-
lects the violator to possible civil penalties,
24. See id. § 1533(a). The Secretary of the
Department of Interior and the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Commerce with the Department of Interior's
approval, have the authority to list species as threat-
ened or endangered based on five factors: (i) destruc-
tion or threat to the species' habitat; (2) overutilization
of the species for commercial, recreational, scientific,
or educational purposes; (3) disease of predation; (4)
the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(5) other natural or manmade factors affecting the
species continued existence. See id. §1533(a)(1). The
determination must be based "solely on the best
scientific and commercial data available." Id.
§ 1533(b)(l)(A).
25. See id. § 1533(b)(i)(B). "Critical habitat" is de-
fined as areas containing physical or biological features
that are "essential to the conservation of the species"
and that "may require special management considera-
tions or protection." Id. § 1532(5)(A). Unlike the listing
of species, the Secretary must take into account both
biological and economic consideration when making
critical habitat designations. See id. § 1533(b)(2).
26. "Take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in such conduct." Id. § 1532(19).
27 Section 9 applies to any "person," defined
broadly to include "an individual, corporation, partner-
ship, trust, association, or any other private entity; or
any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumen-
tality of the Federal Government, of any State, munici-
pality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any for-
criminal penalties, and/or the issuance of an
inlunction resulting from an enforcement
action or citizen suit.31 Section 10 of the ESA
provides a number of exceptions to section 9's
prohibitions, the most significant of which
authorizes the Service to issue an "incidental
take permit" for takings that are "incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity."3 2
Section 7 of the ESA impose; a number of
substantive and procedural duties on all feder-
al agencies. Section 7(a)(1) requires that all
federal agencies, "in consultaticn with and
with the assistance of the Sec'etary, utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes
of Ithe ESAI by carrying out programs for the
conservation of Ilisted endangered and threat-
ened species." 33 Although agencies must affir-
matively use their authority for the conserva-
tion of listed species, the ESA affords agencies
discretion in deciding how to cariy out conser-
vation programs and "does not mandate par-
eign government; any State, municipality or political
subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the
iurisdiction of the United States," Id. § 1532(13)
28. See id. § 1538(a)(I)(B)-(C).
29. See50C.F.R,§ 1731 (1998)
30. 16 US.C § 1538(a)(2) (1994), Section 0 also
includes various prohibitions against tie importation,
possession, sale, transportation, delivery, or shipment
of listed species. Id. § 1538(a)(I)-(2)
3 1. Id. § 1540
32. Id. § 1539(a)(I)(B) A person seeking to obtain
an incidental take permit must submit a conservation
plan to the Service specifying the impacts that will like-
ly result from the taking, what steps will be taken to
minimize those impacts, what alternative actions were
considered and why they were not utilized, and any
other measures the Service requlies See id, §
1539(a)(2)(A). After review of the conseriation plan, the
Service will issue an incidental take permit if it finds
that the taking will be incidental, will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival or recovery of the
species, and the applicant will minimi2e and mitigate
the impacts, provide adequate funding, and employ any
additional measures required by the S~rvtce See id §
1539(a)(2)(B) Any taking of an endangered or threat-
ened species pursuant to and in accordance with the
terms of an incidental take permit will not constitute a
violation of the section 9 take prohibition See id
33, Id. § 1536(a)(1).
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ticular actions be taken by federal agencies to
implement section 7(a)(1)."34
Section 7(a)(2), the focus of this Note,
requires all agencies to "insure that any action
authorized, funded or carried out by such an
agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any [listed speciesl or result in the
adverse modification of [criticall habitat of
such species."35 This provision requires all fed-
eral agencies to "insure" that its actions are not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
a listed species or adversely modify their habi-
tats.3 6 As a means to facilitate compliance with
this duty, section 7(a)(2) also requires agencies
to consult with the Service to identify the
potential effects an agency action may have on
listed species and any reasonable alternatives
that may be employed by the agency to avoid
adverse impacts on listed species and their
habitats.3 7
The FWS and the NMFS have jointly pro-
mulgated regulations establishing a multi-
phase process for implementing the consulta-
tion requirement of section 7 3 First, the
action agency is required to convey to the
Service "a written request for a list of any listed
or proposed species that may be present" in
the action area.39 If the Secretary advises that a
listed species may be present in the action
area and that the federal action is a "malor
construction activity," then the agency will be
required to prepare a Biological Assessment
(BA) to evaluate the potential effects the action
will have on listed or proposed species.40 If the
34. Strahan v. Linnon. 967 F Supp 581. 596 (D
Mass. 1997); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal Emergency
Management Agency. II F. Supp, 2d 529, 543 ID Vi
1998) (quoting Strahan, 967 F. Supp. at 596)
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
36. See td.
37 Id.
38. See 50 C.FR. pt. 402 (1998)
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (1994), 50 C FR §%
402.12(c) (1998). 'Action area" is defined as all areas that
may be "affected directly or indirectly by the Iflederal
action and not merely the immediate area involved in the
action." 50 C.FR. § 402.02 (1998).
40. See 50 C.FR. § 402.12 (1998). "Malor construction
activity" is defined as a "construction prolect (or other
undertaking having similar physical impacts) which is a
BA concludes, and the Service concurs in writ-
ing, that the proposed action is not likely to
adversely affect listed species, the consultation
process is concluded 41 If, however, the BA con-
cludes that the proposed prolect will likely
have adverse effects, the agency is required to
enter into formal consultation with the
Service 42
If the proposed action is not a "malor con-
struction activity," a BA is not required and the
agency must make an independent evaluation
of whether the action "may effect" a listed
species 43 If so. the agency is required to enter
into formal consultation with the Service/44
Alternatively, an agency can satisfy its obliga-
tion to consult by either preparing a BA where
one is not required and seeking Service con-
currence as explained above, or by entering
into informal consultation with the Service4 5
The purpose of both the BA and the informal
consultation requirements is to determine
whether the proposed action is likely to affect
listed species or critical habitat. In either
event, if the Service concludes no likely effect,
consultation is terminated 4 'If the Service con-
cludes that the proposed action will likely have
adverse effects, formal consultation is
required 47
Formal consultation culminates in the
Service issuing a Biological Opinion (BO) eval-
uating whether the proposed action is likely to
"jeopardize the continued existence of' a listed
species or likely to result in the "'destruction or
adverse modification" of critical habitat.48 If the
major Iflederal action significantly affeting the quality of
the human env'orenment as referred to in the National
Environmental Policy Act [NEPA 42 U S C 4334(2jfCj1 - U.
41 See id § 402 14
42 Se id "402 14bj
43 Seed § 402 141al
44 Seed i
45 See il 492 13 [nt*.rmal consultation mcludes
any tpe oit cmmuntcatcon 'with the Service
40 See J
47 See d 402 14
48 See l6 USC § 15361b 119941, 50 CFR §j
402 12(gl411 998i' Ieopardize the continued existence of"
is dehned as engaglingl in an action that reasonably
would be expeted drectly or indirectly, to reduce appre-
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BO concludes that the action is not likely to
jeopardize listed species or adversely modify
critical habitat, the Service will issue a "no jeop-
ardy" opinion.49 If the BO concludes, however,
that the action is likely to jeopardize or modify,
the Service is required to determine whether
there are any "reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives" to the proposed action that would not
result in a jeopardy opinion. 50 If there are rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives, the Service
will issue a "jeopardy opinion with reasonable
and prudent alternatives;" 51 if not, the Service
will issue a "jeopardy opinion without reason-
able and prudent alternatives."52
The action agency has the ultimate respon-
sibility to comply with the mandates of section
7(a)(2) and is not required to implement the
reasonable and prudent alternatives in the
BO.53 If the agency, however, does proceed in
accordance with the alternatives suggested by
the Service, it will have complied with both sec-
tion 7(a)(2)'s mandates. If the agency departs
from the Service's suggested alternatives in the
event of a jeopardy opinion, it may still comply
with section 7(a)(2)'s substantive mandate by
taking "reasonable adequate steps to insure the
continued existence" of listed species. 54 In addi-
tion, if the Service determines that the agency
action will incidentally take listed species and
concludes that neither the agency action nor the
incidental take will violate section 7(a)(2), it is
required to provide an "incidental take state-
ment."55 If the action agency adheres to the
terms and conditions of the incidental take
ciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a
listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.FR. § 402.02
(1998). "Destruction or adverse modification" is defined as
"a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes
the value of critical habitat for both the survival and
recovery of a listed species. Such alterations include, but
are not limited to, alterations adversely modifying any of
those physical or biological features that were the basis
for determining the habitat to be critical." Id.
49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998).
50. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(h)(3). An alternative is reasonable and prudent
only if it is (1) consistent with the intended purpose of the
agency action; (2) within the scope of the action agency's
authority jurisdiction; and (3) economically and techno-
logically feasible. See 50 C.FR. § 402.02.
statement, it will be exempt from any claim
under the section 9 take prohibition. 6
The consultation requirements are impor-
tant to agencies for two reasons. First, consulta-
tion provides a means by which the agency can
guarantee compliance with section 7(a)(2)'s
mandate to insure that its actions are not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species or result in the adverse modification of
critical habitat. Second, through the incidental
take statement contained in the BO, an agency
may insulate itself from liability under the sec-
tion 9 take prohibition. The implication then is
that if an agency incorrectly concludes that its
actions are not subject to section 7(a)(2), it may
unknowingly expose itself to a potential lawsuit
for the failure to meet its duties to insure and
consult under section 7(a)(2) and for the takings
of species under section 9
B. Applicability of Section 7(a)(2: Tnggered
by "Agency Action"
The requirements of section 7(a)(2) lie at
the heart of the ESA's protective measures with
respect to federal governmental activities,
Section 7(a)(2) imposes a substantive mandate
on all federal agencies to insure that their
actions are not likely to jeopardize the existence
of listed species or destroy their critical habitat,
It also requires that agencies consult with the
Service. This process is aimed at identifying the
effects a given action will have on listed species
and any alternatives that may be employed to
satisfy the substantive mandate. In this respect,
51. 50C.YR.§40202.
52. Id.
53, See d, § 402 15 cf. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v
United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F2d 1410, 1418 (9th
Cir. 1990).
54. See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v Hodel, 859
F.2d 651. 660 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. See 16 U SC § 1536(b)(4), 50 C FR §
402.14(i)(1) (1998). The incidental take statement must
also identify "reasonable and prudent measures" that the
Service believes are necessary to minimize the impact of
the incidental take and may include only "minor changes"
that do not alter the basic design, location, duration, or
timing of the proposed action See 50 C FR § 402 14(1),
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)
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section 7(a)(2) is of primary importance both to
those agencies trying to comply with the ESA
and to those species whose continued existence
depends on the protective measures of the ESA,
The requirements of section 7(a)(2) are
triggered by the existence of an "agency
action," defined as "any action authorized,
funded or carried out" by a federal agency.57 In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,' 8 the Supreme
Court found the scope of this definition to be
all-inclusive and without exception. Based on a
plain reading of the statutory language, further
supported by the legislative history and under-
lying purpose of the ESA, the Supreme Court
concluded:
One would be hard pressed to find a
statutory provision whose terms were
any plainer than in Isection] 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words
affirmatively command all federal
agencies "to insure that actions autho-
rized, funded or carried out by them do
not jeopardize the continued exis-
tence" of an endangered species or
"result in the destruction or modifica-
tion of habitat of such species "
This language admits of no excep-
tion.5 9
The Court also found that "the legislative his-
tory undergirding [section] 7 reveals an explic-
it congressional decision to require agencies
to afford first priority to the declared national
policy of saving endangered species" and "to
give endangered species priority over the 'pri-
mary missions' of federal agencies."60
In response to Hill, Congress amended the
57. id. § 1536(a) (1994).
58. 437 U.S. at 173.
59. Id.
60. id. at 185.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91
62. See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F3d 677.
680-81 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining why section 7(a)(2)
applies to a preexisting water service contract where the
United States must act each year to supply water),
Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F2d 712, 715 (Ist
Cir. 1979) (holding that the ESA will apply to any contract
ESA, confirming the Court's interpretation of
the language of section 7 and of the ESA as a
powerful statute intended to impose obliga-
tions on agencies that are in addition to, and
with priority over, other agency obligations. 61
As such, federal courts have followed the Hill
decision and interpreted the scope of "agency
action" under 7(a)(2) broadly6 2
The Service's joint regulations are also in
accord with the above authorities with respect
to the definition of "action" Section 402.02 of
the joint regulations defines "action" as
JAII activities or programs of any kind
authorized, funded or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Iflederal agencies
in the United States or upon the high
seas, Examples include, but are not
limited to [aj actions intended to con-
serve listed species or their habitat, (b)
the promulgation of regulations, (c)
the granting of licenses, contracts,
leases, easements, rights-of-way, per-
mits, or grants in aid; or (d) actions
directly or indirectly causing modifica-
tions to the land, water, or air.6 3
This definition of "action" does not limit the
definition of "agency action" found in section
7(a)(2) except for the geographical limitation,
making section 7[a)12) applicable only to
actions taken "within the United States or upon
the high seas"
In sum, congressional intent, judicial inter-
pretations. and the Service's definition of
"action" all support the conclusion that the
definition of "agency action" under section
7(a)(21 means exactly what it says, "any action
the Secretary enters into which requires a future action on
the Secretary s part), Pacific Rivers Council v Thomas, 30
F3d 1050, 1054 [9th Cir 1994) 1[TIhere is little doubt that
Congress intended to enact a broad definition of agency
action in the ESA, and therefore the [Forest Services land
resource management plansl are continuing agency
action '1. Lane County Audubon Soc y v lamison. 958 F3i
290 294 (9th Cir 1992) [holding that a document promul-
gated by the Bureau of Land Management for conserva-
tion of the northern spotted owl was 'agency actior
requinng consultation under the ESAJ
63 50 C FR § 402 02 1998) [emphasis added).
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authorized, funded or carried out" by federal
agencies must meet the mandates of section
7(a)(2). The only exception to this clear
requirement is where an agency has obtained
an exemption pursuant to section 7(h).64
Otherwise, the scope of agency action subject
to section 7(a)(2) is without exception. Given
the above authorities, any interpretation limit-
ing the scope of "agency action" under section
7(a)(2) should be impermissible as contrary to
congressional intent. Nevertheless, the Service
has limited the scope of section 7(a)(2) by pro-
mulgating section 402.03 of the joint regula-
tions.
Section 402.03, defining the applicability of
section 7, provides that "Islection 7 and the
requirements of this Part apply to all actions in
which there is discretionary [flederal involve-
ment or control."65 In effect, section 402.03
redefines the definition of "agency action"
under section 7(a)(2) from "any action autho-
rized, funded or carried out" by an agency, to
"any discretionary action authorized, funded,
or carried out" by an agency. Thus, the Service's
interpretation of the applicability of section 7
creates an exception to section 7(a)(2)'s man-
dates for nondiscretionary actions, directly
conflicting with the Supreme Court's finding
that section 7(a)(2) "admits of no exception."66
Nevertheless, a number of courts have given
section 402.03 the force of law and relied on it
to find agency action exempt from section
7(a)(2).67
Prior to the promulgation of the current
version of section 402.03 in June 1986, the dis-
cretionary character of a given agency action
played no part in determining the applicability
of section 7 This discretionary element does
not appear in the statutory language of the
ESA, its legislative history, or any ludicial inter-
pretations of section 7(a)(2) other than those
relying on section 402.03 itself. In fact, the ver-
sion of section 402.03 in place prior to 1986 did
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1994).
65. 50 C.YR. § 402.03 (1998) (emphasis added).
66. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153. 173
(1978). It is interesting to note that if sectioq 402.03 is
read as applying only to section 7(a)(1), which explicitly
provides agencies with discretion in meeting their obliga-
not contain any reference to agency discretion.
The pre-1986 version of section 402.03 inter-
preted the applicability of section 7 as applying
"to all activities or programs where Iflederal
involvement or control remains which in itself
could leopardize the continued existence of a
listed species or modify or destroy critical
habitat."68 So, on what basis was; the change
made and what does it mean?
The Service has not explained the basis for
exempting nondiscretionary actions and has
not provided any guidance for ascertaining
what it means. Rather, it has been left solely to
the courts to determine the existence or lack of
discretion with respect to a given agency action
on a case by case basis. Interestingly, a number
of courts have willingly applied se:tion 402.03,
but no court to date has yet addressed its
validity. In order to delineate the meaning of
"nondiscretionary agency action," the following
discussion will analyze those ludicial opinions
relying on section 402.03
III. Judicial Application of Section 402.03
Since the promulgation of the current ver-
sion of section 402.03, judicial analysis regard-
Ing the applicability of section 7(a)(2) has
changed in a number of courts to include an
analysis of the discretionary character of the
"agency action" in question. In a handful of
cases, courts have found agency action that
would have otherwise triggered section
7(a)(2)'s mandates to be exempt from its
requirements. In all of the cases applying sec-
tion 402.03, the courts have ascertained the
discretionary character of the agercy action at
issue by looking at the agency's operative
statute, a contract the agency was party to, or
the ability of the agency to control 1-he ultimate
acts that may threaten listed species. Three
categories of holdings emerge: (1) the agency
has no express discretionary authority to con-
tions to provide for the conservation of species, then sec-
tion 402.03 does not create any contradicory problems.
See 16 U.S.C § 1536(a)(1), This, however, is not the inter-
pretation court3 are employing
67 See infra Part II1.
68. 50 C.YR. § 402.03 (1998).
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sider and provide for the protection of wildlife;
therefore, the application of section 402.03
renders section 7(a)(2) inapplicable; (2) the
agency does have express discretionary
authority to consider and provide for protec-
tion of wildlife; therefore, the application of
section 402.03 does not exclude the agency
action from section 7(a)(2); and (3) the agency
does not have the authority to control or influ-
ence the actions of other parties who may
threaten listed species, making any actions
taken by the agency nondiscretionary and not
sublect to section 7(a)(2). The following sec-
tion discusses each of these categories in turn
and identifies potential issues raised by the
courts' holdings.
Two recorded opinions have held agency
action exempt from section 7(a)(2) where the
agency did not possess any express discre-
tionary authority to consider or provide for the
protection of wildlife. In Strahan v. United States
Coast Guard,69 a district court in Massachusetts
held that the Coast Guard's documentation
and inspection of vessels is a nondiscretionary
activity, and, as such, the Coast Guard is not
required to consult with the NMFS concerning
the effects of those actions. The court looked
to the Coast Guard's operative statute and con-
cluded that "the Coast Guard is required to
issue Certificates of Documentation and
Inspection if the specific statutory and regula-
tory criteria, which make no reference to envi-
ronmental concerns, are met."70 The court held
that these specific criteria leave the Coast
Guard with only nondiscretionary responsibili-
ties; therefore, the application of section
402.03 renders the Coast Guard's inspection
and documentation of vessels exempt from the
requirements of section 7(a)(2).71
69. 967 F. Supp. 581, 622 (D. Mass. 1995),
70. Id. at 621.
71. Seeid. at 621-22.
72. 65 F.3d 1502. 1509 (9th Cir 1995),
73. See id. at 1505-06.
74. Under the nght of way agreement, the BLM
could reiect a proposed road construction only if the pro-
posed route was: (i) not the most direct, (2) substantial-
ly interfering with existing or planned facilities, or
(3) resulting in excessive soil erosion. Outside of these
.P
In Sierra Club v' Babbitt,72 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) had no discretion to consider the pro-
tection of the endangered spotted owl when
approving the construction of a logging road
pursuant to a right-of-way agreement. The
plaintiffs in the case sought to enjoin the con-
struction of a logging road by Seneca Sawmill
Company on BLM lands under a right-of-way
agreement entered into prior to the passage of
the ESA" The right-of-way agreement permit-
ted the BLM to consider only three specific fac-
tors in approving the proposed road project7 4
Plaintiffs claimed that the BLM violated section
7(a)(2) by approving the road construction in
question without consulting with the FWS con-
cerning the effects of the road's construction on
the threatened spotted owl"7 The court framed
the issue as the following: "To what extent does
section 7 apply where the BLM granted nght-of-
way by contract to a private entity before pas-
sage of the ESA and the agency's continuing
ability to influence the private conduct is limit-
ed to three factors unrelated to the conserva-
tion of the threatened spotted owl, 76 The court
stated that "Ithe regulations supply the
answer."7 Specifically, section 402,03 provides
that section 7 applies only to agency actions
where there is "discretionary involvement or
control, "78 Based on section 402,03 and the
conditions of the right-of-way agreement, the
court concluded that the BLM does not possess
any discretionary authority because it lacks the
ability to influence Seneca's right-of-way pro-
]ect.7 As such, the court held that the require-
ments of section 7(a)(2) do not apply and that
the BLM is not required to consult with the
FVS regarding the effects of Seneca's road con-
struction on the endangered spotted owl.80
three factors, the BLM was unable under the terms of the
agreement to oppose the road construction See i at
1505-06
75 See td at 1507
76 Id at 1508
77 id at 1509
78 50CFR § 402 03 (1998)
79 SeeSierra Club, 65 F3d at 1509-10-
80 See id at 1509 (citing SOC FR § 402 03)
i
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Strahan and Sierra Club present two situa-
tions where an agency's discretion was limit-
ed either by statute or under contract. In both,
the agencies were deemed to have no express
discretionary authority to consider species
protection. Both agencies, however, did have
some discretionary authority to consider
other factors. For instance, in Sierra Club, the
BLM had discretion to consider and protect
against excessive soil erosion.8' Thus, it can
be drawn from these two cases that section
402.03 limits the applicability of section
7(a)(2) to those situations where an agency's
action is conducted pursuant to express dis-
cretionary authority to consider the protec-
tion of wildlife species. Not lust any type of
discretionary power will suffice to bring the
agency action within the scope of the discre-
tionary involvement or control requirement of
section 402.03
The second group of cases holds that sec-
tion 402.03 does not exempt agency action
from section 7(a)(2) where the agency pos-
sesses discretionary authority to consider and
provide for the protection of wildlife. In Florida
Key Deer v. Stickney,82 a district court in Florida
held that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) had discretionary authority to
consider the protection of wildlife and was
therefore required to consult with the FWS
pursuant to section 7(a)(2). The plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to
force FEMA to consult with the FWS pursuant
to section 7(a)(2) concerning the potential
impacts FEMA's flood relief actions might
have on listed species. 83 In examining
whether section 402.03 provided an exception
to the requirements of section 7(a)(2), the
court initially stated that "[a] construction of
section 402.03 as being a limitation on the
geographical discretion of federal agencies is
the only construction that is compatible with
81. id. at 1505.
82. 864 F Supp. 1222, 1226 (D. Fla. 1994).
83. See id. at 1224.
84. Id. at 1239.
85. See id. at 1239-40.
86. See id. at 1239.
the statutory provisions of Section 7 and the
legislative history of the ESA."84 Nevertheless,
the court proceeded to examine the scope of
FEMA's discretionary powers under the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 85
The court found that FEMA had broad discre-
tionary authority under the National Flood
Insurance Action (NFIA) to proirulgate regu-
lations necessary to carry out the purposes of
NFIA.86 Under this authority, FEMA promul-
gated regulations implementing the Council
on Environmental Quality's regulations under
the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), as well as regulations to implement
an executive order for the protection of wet-
lands.87 Under these regulations, FEMA was
authorized to consider wildlife protection, but
under FEMA's operative statute no such dis-
cretion was cited. 88 Based on these findings of
discretionary authority, the court concluded
"as a matter of law that FEMA has broad dis-
cretion to 'issue such regulation3 as may be
necessary to carry out the purpose of ithe
NFIPI' and, therefore [section) 402.03 does
.not operate to exempt FEMA from the
requirements of Section 7 of the ESA."8" The
court granted plaintiffs' request for declarato-
ry and injunctive relief and ordered FEMA to
consult with the FWS.90
In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Houston,9 1 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) engaged in "agency
action" under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA when
it renewed water supply contracts with sever-
al water districts in California. The water dis-
tricts argued that the USBR had no discretion
to alter the terms of the renewal :ontracts to
decrease the amount of water to be delivered
because the districts had a first right to a stat-
ed quantity of project water.92 The court stat-
ed that "Iwlhere there is no agency discretion
87 See id.
88. See id.
89 id. at 1240.
90. Seeid. at 1242,
91. 146 F3d 1118, 1125-26(9thCir. 1998).
92. See id.
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to act, the ESA does not apply."93 Because fed-
eral reclamation laws required that water con-
tracts be renewed on "mutually agreeable
terms" and that the USBR had discretion to
limit the amount of available project water for
sale if necessary to comply with the ESA. the
court concluded that the USBR had discretion
to limit the quantity of water to be delivered
when renegotiating the renewal contracts 9 4
Thus, the court held that the USBR's renewal of
the water contracts constituted "agency action"
for purposes of section 7(a)(2).95
Both Houston and Flonda Key Deer follow the
same analysis in that they find section 7(a)(2)
applicable to a given agency action where the
agency is found to possess express discre-
tionary authority to consider wildlife protec-
tion. In this respect, their holdings reach the
opposite result as in Strahan and Sierra Club.
Florida Key Deer, however, differs from the other
three with respect to where it found the discre-
tionary authority. Both Houston and Strahan look
to the USBR's operative statute as the source
of discretionary authority. In Flonda Key Deer,
the court only finds a general grant of authori-
ty to promulgate regulations "as may be neces-
sary to carry out the purposes of [the NFIA in
FEMAs operative statute."96 Yet, the court cites
no authority stemming from FEMA's operative
statute. Instead, the court relies on regulations
promulgated by FEMA providing for considera-
tion of wildlife protection but intended to
implement NEPA and an executive order for
the protection of wetlands.
The question then is to what extent may
discretionary authority be derived from con-
gressional enactments other than the agency's
operative statute. If such authority can be
drawn from statutes such as NEPA, does any
federal agency lack discretionary authority" Or
is it necessary that the agency first promulgate
93. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F3d 1502,
1509 (9th Cir. 1995)).
94. See Houston. 146 F.3d at 1126-27
95. See id.
96. 864 R Supp. at 1239 (citing National Flood
Insurance, 42 U.S.C. § 4128(a) (1994)).
97. 83 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996).
regulations specifying that it intends to con-
sider wildlife protection in its efforts to comply
with NEPA? Moreover, under this analysis can
it be argued that the ESA itself grants agencies
discretionary authority to implement its man-
dates? If so, section 402.03 is inconsistent with
the ESA in that it exempts that which the ESA
grants. Specifically, the ESA grants agencies
the discretion to consider wildlife protection.
The final group of published decisions
where section 402,03 was applied involved the
question of whether the FWS engaged in
"agency action" with regard to proposed log-
ging operations in the Pacific Northwest. In
Marbled Murrelet v, Babbitt (Marbled Murrelet 1),97
the Ninth Circuit lifted a preliminary injunction
issued by a district court against a number of
lumber companies from salvaging dead, dying
and decaying trees, and against the Depart-
ment of Interior and the FWS from approving
any cutting or removal pursuant to exemption
notices without first prepanng a BA and a BO
as required by the ESA_ A summary of the
underlying facts is necessary to fully compre-
hend the outcome of this case.
California law requires that before com-
mencing any timber operations, a Timber
Harvest Plan (THP) must be submitted for
approval by the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF). 9s An
exemption from this general requirement
applies for the cutting and removal of "dead,
dying and diseased trees," subject to certain
conditions " To obtain a permit to remove
dead, dying and diseased trees, a notice of the
proposed operation must be submitted to the
CDF, and within ten days of receipt of such
notice, the CDF must determine whether the
notice is -complete and accurate. " 100 If it is
complete and accurate, the CDF sends the sub-
mitter a notice of acceptance 101 If not, the CDF
98 See CAL Pas REs CooE §§ 4581-458275
(Deering 1993 & Supp 1998)
99 See id § 4584(c); CAL CO.E RE S tit. 14,
§ 1038(b) (1998)
100 See C4, C7,:F RECS tit 14, § 1038fe, 1038 i
(1998)
101- See id § 1038(e)
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returns the notice to the submitter.102 If the
CDF fails to act within ten days of receiving the
notice, the submitter may commence with its
operations.103
The lumber companies involved in Marbled
Murrelet I initially submitted a notice of pro-
posed timber salvage for a 5994-acre parcel in
Humboldt County, including Headwaters
Forest, and indicated that some of the area
may be important to threatened or endangered
species. 04 The CDF rejected the notice and
requested the lumber companies to identify
the location and habitat of any rare, threat-
ened, or endangered species. 1 5 The lumber
companies then resubmitted their notice with
the requested information.10 6 The CDF accept-
ed the resubmitted notice and reiterated the
conditions that the companies consult with
and inform the California Department of Fish
and Game (CDFG) and the FWS before com-
mencing any operations. 107 The CDF also
required that the CDFG and the FWS conduct
on-site inspections and approve the cutting of
any standing trees. 08 The lumber companies
disputed these conditions with the CDF and
later met with representatives of the CDFG and
the FWS on the issue. 1 9 In response to this
meeting, the CDFG and the FWS sent a joint
letter to the lumber companies reviewing the
on-site inspections and setting forth a number
of conditions that had to be met to comply
with state law and to avoid a take of identified
species under the ESA. 110 The lumber compa-
nies requested clarification of these condi-
tions, the CDFG and the FWS provided the clar-
ification, and the lumber companies then noti-
102. See id.
103. See id.
104, 83 F3d at 1071. Headwaters Forest is a previ-
ously undisturbed 3000-acre old-growth redwood stand.
See id. The Headwaters Forest has since been purchased
by the Federal and State governments in March 1999 as
part of the "Headwaters Agreement." See EPIC
(Environmental Protection Information Center),






fied all three agencies that they would comply
with all the conditions and that they intended
to start harvesting dead, dying diseased trees
in the Headwaters Forest somel:ime shortly
after September 15, 1995 "'1
On this same date, the Environmental
Protection Information Center (EPIC) filed a
complaint alleging that the FWS had engaged
in discretionary agency action, thus requiring
the FWS to conduct internal consultation" 12
and to prepare a BA and a BO 113 EPIC sought
to enjoin the Secretary of Interior and the FWS
from approving any cutting or removal pur-
suant to the exemption notices.i 4 The district
court issued a preliminary injunction against
the lumber company defendants, but declined
to enjoin the federal defendants. The lumber
company defendants appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. i15
The Ninth Circuit framed the issue to be
decided as "whether evidence was presented to
the district court which indicated discretionary
federal involvement or control over the
Illumber Iclompanies' intended tree salvage
operations sufficient to raise a serious ques-
tion whether the IIFWS engaged in 'agency
action' under the ESA."i 16 Citing section 40203
and Sierra Club, the court stated "[aln action is
an 'agency action' if there is 'cliscretionary
Iflederal involvement or control."' 17 In relect-
ing the argument that the FWS exercised dis-
cretionary involvement or control, the court
emphasized that nothing in the communica-
tions that took place "justifies an inference that
the []FWS has the authority to enforce
California's laws or regulations" and that "there
109. See id. at 1072.
110. Seeid.
I11. Seeid,
112. When the FWS (or the NMFS) is the acting
agency, the consultation requirements of !;ection 7(a)(2)
are termed internal consultation due to the fact that the
FWS is essentially consulting with itself




117. Id. at 1073 (citing Sierra Club v. Eabbitt, 65 F3d
1502, 1509 (9th Cir 1995)).
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is no evidence that the I IFWS had any power to
enforce those conditions other than its author-
ity under section 9 of the ESA, and this is not
enough to trigger 'federal action' under section
7 "118 Furthermore, the court stated that
"[wlhen an agency 'lacks the discretion to
influence the private action' there is no 'agency
action."" 19
The court concluded that the FWS was
"merely providing advice on how the Illumber
Iclompanies could avoid a 'take' under section
9" and that "as a matter of law, such advisory
activity does not constitute discretionary
involvement or control over the Illumber
Iclompanies' proposed tree harvests." 120 The
court then held that there was no serious ques-
tion as to whether the FWS engaged in "agency
action" under section 7, and it reversed the
preliminary inlunction issued by the lower
court.
121
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Marbled Murrelet 1, EPIC sought to obtain a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) preventing the
Illumber Iclompanies from harvesting under
the exemption notices accepted by the CDF.'2
The basis for EPIC's TRO motion was the same
as in Marbled Murrelet I: The FWS had engaged in
"agency action" requiring consultation under
section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. The district court
relected EPIC's motion, holding that the
"Service does not engage in agency action'
when it provides technical advice or informal
guidance to state agencies as to whether and
to what extent a proposal to harvest trees
might affect a listed species."23 The court cited
both section 402.03 and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Marbled Murrelet I in holding that
nondiscretionary agency action is outside the
scope of section 7(a)(2) requirements.
EPIC continued its fight to prevent logging
118. Id. at 1074 (citing Sierra Club. 65 F3d at 1511
n. 15).
119. Id. at 1074 (citing Sierra Club. 65 F3d at 1509)
120. Marbled Murrelet I, 83 F3d at 1074-75,
121. See id.
122. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 1996 WL
532112, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18. 1996).
123. Id. at *5.
in Humboldt County and once again found
itself before the Ninth Circuit, In Marbled
Murrelet v Babbitt (Marbled Murrelet 11),124 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that two concurrence let-
ters issued by the FWS and used by the
Illumber Iclompanies to satisfy the require-
ments of a California law did not constitute an
"agency action" requiring the FWS to internally
consult Under California law, any logging
operation must proceed under a Timber
Harvest Plan ITHPJ approved by the CDF 125 To
obtain approval, an applicant must proceed in
accordance with one of seven alternatives to
provide the CDF with the necessary informa-
tion to determine whether the logging opera-
tion will result in the take of an endangered
species 12, One of these options allows the
CDF to consider an opinion issued by the FWS
that the operation is not likely to take a listed
species 127 The FVS issued two concurrence
letters that were used by the Illumber Iclompa-
nies to satisfy the information submittal
requirement and obtain the CDFs approval of
eight THPs 12s Based on the argument that the
FWS had engaged in "agency action" by issuing
the concurrence letters. EPIC had successfully
obtained a preliminary mlunction on the THPs
from the district court-121 The issue before the
Ninth Circuit then was whether the district
court, in granting the preliminary inlunction,
was correct in finding that there existed a seri-
ous question as to whether the FWS's issuance
of concurrence letters constituted "agency
action" and its failure to initiate internal con-
sultation violated section 71a)12) 13 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the district court's find-
ing that the concurrence letters constituted an
approval of the THPs 131 The Ninth Circuit cited
to its previous opinion in Marbled Murrelet I and
held that "when an agency lacks the discretion
124 111 F3d 1447, 1450 19th Cir 1997J
125 SeeCAL PRt R;s C::-4581 iDeenng 19931
126 See C,L C,:- RUS ttt 14, § 919 9 1 Q981
127 See id , 919 Q9el
128 See Marbd Murret 11, 11 i F3d at 1449
129 Seeid at 1447
130 Seeid at 1449
131 See d
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to influence private action, there is no 'agency
action."' 132 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it
is the CDF, not the FWS, which possesses the
discretion to influence the private action in
this case, and, as such, there was no serious
question as to whether the FWS engaged in
"agency action" under section 7(a)(2). 133 Based
on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
preliminary inlunction. 134
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decisions
in Marbled Murrelet I and Marbled Murrelet 1I, the
lower court entered summary ludgment in
favor of the FWS and the Illumber Iclompanies
with respect to both the exemption harvests
and the THPs at issue in the those lawsuits. 13 5
Following the Ninth Circuit's previous holdings
and its own holding denying EPIC's TRO
motion, the court held that the FWS had not
engaged in an action over which it had discre-
tionary involvement or control, and thus, was
not required to initiate internal consultation.136
The Marbled Murrelet cases put an interest-
ing twist on the determination of an agencys
discretionary authority. The Ninth Circuit held
in both Marbled Murrelet I and Marbled Murrelet II
that "when an agency lacks the discretion to
influence private action, there is no 'agency
action."' 13 7 It is evident from the court's analy-
sis in Marbled Murrelet I that "lack of discretion
to influence" means lack of authority to enforce
species protection measures under state law;
without such enforcement capabilities, the
FWS is acting only in an advisory capacity. 38
Instead of looking to the FWS's operative
statute or the agency's regulations, the Ninth
Circuit looks to the enforcement capabilities of
the FWS to determine whether there is discre-
tionary authority. This implies that discre-
tionary agency action may only be found where
the agency has authority to require specific
conduct. In Southwest Center for Biological Diversity
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,139 the
court characterized the Ninth Circuit's position
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1450.
134. See id.
135. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt. 1997 WL
361232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997).
136. See id. at *6-8.
as "placling] a stronger emphasis on the
weightier requirement of 'control' versus the
lesser requirement of 'involvement,' Accord-
ingly, advisory activity does not constitute
'agency action' under the ESA."
The above opinions are the only published
cases to date that have applied section 402,03.
They reveal that section 402.03 is given the
force of law. As a result, the analysis for deter-
mining whether an agency action is sublect to
the requirements of section 7(a)(2) has
changed to include an analysis of the discre-
tionary character of the agency action in ques-
tion. These cases also provide a frame of refer-
ence for defining the scope and meaning of
section 402.03. Taking the cases together, it
appears that section 402.03 exempts from sec-
tion 7(a)(2) those agency actions proceeding
under congressional mandates that do not pro-
vide for express discretionary authorization to
consider and provide for the protection of
wildlife. Where the agency does possess
express discretion to protect wildlife under its
operative statute, or possibly under other con-
gressional mandates, then section 7(a)(2) will
apply to the discretionary actions taken pur-
suant to them. In addition, even if the agency
has sufficient discretion but does not possess
the authority to control the outcome of private
or state actions, any action it takes with respect
to that private or state entity will be deemed
nondiscretionary and not sublect to section
7(a)(2).
In sum, the above cases have applied sec-
tion 402.03 to exempt certain agency actions
from the mandates of section 71a)(2). Given
that the definition of "agency action" under sec-
tion 7(a)(2) has been interpreted as
"admitlting] of no exception" and that Con-
gress has expressed its clear intent to give
species protection priority over the primary
missions of federal agencies, the exceptions
carved out by section 402.03 seem to pull back
137. 83 F3d at 1074 (citing Sierra Club v Babbitt, 65
F3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)); 111 F3d at 1449 (citing
Marbled Murrelet I, 83 F.3d at 1074),
138. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21
139 967 F Supp 1166, 1176-77 (D Ariz 1997) (cit-
ing Marbled Murrelet I, 83 F3d at 1073)
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the reach of the ESA as it applies to agency
actions. Part IV addresses the question of
whether section 402.03 was promulgated law-
fully and whether it is a reasonable interpreta-
tion of section 7(a)(2).
IV. Section 402.03 was Promulgated In
Violation of the APA
The promulgation of the current version of
section 402.03 by the Service in 1986 violated
the procedural requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) in two respects.
First, the promulgation of section 402.03 did
not satisfy the notice and comment require-
ments of section 553 of the APA.149 Section
553(b) provides that "Igleneral notice of pro-
posed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register" and that such "notice shall
include (3) either the terms or substance of
the proposed rule or a description of the sub-
jects and issues involved.'3 41 Section 553(c)
also requires that "the agency shall give inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments."' 42
In response to a number of substantive
congressional amendments to the ESA, the
Service published a Proposed Rule Making
(PRM) in the Federal Register for the purpose
of "amendlingi existing rules governing
Islection 7 consultation by implementing
changes required by the amendments and by
incorporating procedural changes designed to
improve interagency cooperation. '" 43 The pub-
lic was then given the opportunity to comment,
Eventually, the Service promulgated the Final
Rule in 1986.144 In the PRM, section 402.03
read: "Applicability. Section 7 and the require-
ments of this Part apply to all actions in which
140. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) §I, 5 U S C §
553 (1994).
141. Id. § 553(b).
142. Id. § 553(c).
143. 48 Fed. Reg. 29.990, 29,999 (1983),
144. See generally 51 Fed. Reg. 19.926 (1986)
145. 48 Fed. Reg. at 29,999 (emphasis added).
146. 51 Fed. Reg. at 19.958 (emphasis added)
there is Iflederal involvement or control "t45
This language presented no change from the
version of section 402.03 appearing in the joint
regulations prior to the publication of the
PRM. However, in the Final Rule, section
402,03 stated "Applicability. Section 7 and the
requirements of this Part apply to all actions in
which there is discretionary Iflederal involve-
ment or control_"146 The insertion of the word
"discretionary" into the Final Rule, where it did
not appear in the PRM, violates section 553 of
the APA
Notice of proposed rules can be satisfied
by providing notice which either specifies the
"terms or substance" of the proposed regula-
tion or merely identifies the "subjects and
issues involved" in the rule making proceed-
ings 147 The PRM fails to satisfy the notice
requirement under either of these two meth-
ods with respect to section 402 03 By failing to
include the term "discretionary" in the PRM
version of section 402 03 and later inserting it
into the Final Rule version, the Service failed to
give notice of the "terms or substance" of the
changed language, and thus, the applicability
of section 7 In addition, there is nothing in the
PRM or in the congressional amendments to
the ESA indicating that changing the applica-
bility of section 7 by amending section 402-03
was a "subject" or "issue" involved in the rule
making proceedings The PRM merely restated
word for word the language of the already
existing section 402 03 No discussion relating
to a change in the applicability of section 7 is
found anywhere in the PRM, the issue was
never raised In fact, the Final Rule does not
even acknowledge that the change occurred
In American Medical Association v United
States,AS the Seventh Circuit held that,
147 Sfl5USC 5531b3i
148 American 1Med Ass v Unite- States 887 F2i
760. 76717th Or 189) wao .,3 National Bai'. Media Coal ,ti n
- Federal Cmmuntcations Comm n 791 F25 1016 1022 2nd
Cir I9,61 g'While a hnal rule need n t be a' 3t repll:a of
the rule prcpcsed in the Ntice the final rule must be a 'og-
cal outgrowth cf the rule pr,pzsea and it the final, rule dev-
ates tco shwapl, Irm the proposal affected parties w.ill be
deprived of rctice and an opportunty to respond to the pro-
pVsal j Small Rehncer Lead Phase-Do',n Task Force v EPA,
705 F2d 506 547 IDC Ctr 19831 iThe test for determinng the
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notice [of proposed rule making] is
adequate if it apprises interested par-
ties of the issues to be addressed in
the rule[ Imaking proceeding with suffi-
cient clarity and specificity to allow
them to participate in the rulelimaking
in a meaningful and informed manner.
Stated another way, a final rule is not
invalid for lack of adequate notice if
the rule finally adopted is "a logical
outgrowth" of the original proposal.
With regard to section 402.03, the PRM did not
inform the public that the Service was consid-
ering limiting the applicability of section 7 to
discretionary involvement or control or was
intending to change the language of section
402.03 in any way. As a result: the public was
not given an opportunity to comment on the
issue, and interested parties were not able to
"participate in the rule[lmaking in any mean-
ingful and informed manner."'149 Furthermore,
there is no language in the PRM to support a
conclusion that the final language of section
402.03 was a "logical outgrowth of the original
proposal." Due to these omissions, the pro-
mulgation of section 402.03 violated section
553 of the APA by failing to provide adequate
notice and comment. 50
Section 553 does provide for an exception
to its notice and comment requirements for
"interpretive rules."isi Because section 402.03
does interpret the meaning of section 7's
applicability, it could be argued that it falls
within this exception. The scope of this excep-
tion, however, has been construed narrowly. In
American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health
Administration,152 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court found that the determination of
whether a rule is an interpretative rule or a leg-
islative rule depends on whether the rule,
adequacy of notice of proposed rule making is whether it "fair-
ly appnselsl interested persons of the subjects and issues.").
149. Amencan Med. Ass'n, 887 F2d at 767
150. See id. at 768 ("IAI rule will be invalidated if no
notice was given of an issue addressed by the final rules.").
151. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
has "legal effect," which in turn is best
ascertained by asking (1) whether in
the absence of the rule there would not
be an adequate legislative basis for
enforcement action or other agency
action to confer benefits or ensure the
performance of duties, (2) whether the
agency has published the rule in the
Code of Federal Regulations,
(3) whether the agency has explicitly
invoked its general legislativE authori-
ty, or (4) whether the rule effectively
amends a prior legislative rule. If the
answer to any of these questions is
affirmative, we have a legislative, not
an interpretive rule.
While the first question does not come into
play because section 402.03 is actually limiting
the legislative basis for ensuring the perfor-
mance of duties, the other questions from
American Mining Congress are answered in the
affirmative. Section 402.03 was published in the
Code of Federal Regulations, the Service explic-
itly invoked its legislative authority when it pro-
mulgated the joint regulations, and the prior
version of section 402.03 was effectively
amended. Moreover, the cases applying section
402.03 make it clear that section 402.03 does
indeed have legal effect. Therefore, because
section 402.03 has a clear legal effect, it is not
an interpretive rule exempt from the notice and
comment requirements of section 553
In addition to violating the notice and
comment requirements of section 553(b) of the
APA, the promulgation of section 402.03 also
violated section 553(c) by failing to provide an
adequate statement of the basis and purpose
in the Final Rule. Section 553(c) provides that
"[alfter consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of
152. 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (DC CirW 1993), see also
Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F2d 043, 949 (DC
Cir 1987) ("It is beyond question that many such state-
ments are non-binding in nature and would thus be char-
acterized by the court as interpretive ruleE or policy state-
ments. We are persuaded that courts will appropriately
reach an opposite conclusion only where, as here, the
agency itself has given its rules substantive effect,')
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their basis and purpose."153 In Independent U.S.
Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole,154 the court stat-
ed that "[alt the least, such a [concise and gen-
eral] statement should indicate the major
issues of policy that were raised in the proceed-
ings and explain why the agency decided to
respond to these issues as it did, particularly in
light of the statutory objectives that the rule
must serve." The purpose of this rule is to
inform the public of the basis and purpose of
the promulgated rule and to provide for effec-
tive judicial review.155 The Final Rule did provide
a statement, but it was far from adequate. The
statement read:
This section, which explains the applic-
ability of Section 7, implicitly covers
Iflederal activities within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States and
upon the high seas as a result of the
definition of"action" in Isection] 402.02.
The explanation for the scope of the
term "action" is provided in the discus-
sion under [section] 402.01 above. 156
Nowhere in this explanation, or in the explana-
tions under section 402.01 or 402.03, is there
any discussion concerning the insertion of the
word "discretionary" or any discussion concern-
ing the amended language. In fact, the Final
Rule does not even acknowledge that a change
took place. The "concise and general statement"
required by section 553(c) for explaining the
basis and purpose for amending section 402.03
153. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
154. 809 F.2d 847. 852 (D.C. Cir 1987), cert dented,
484 U.S. 819 (1987) (holding that in promulgating a ship-
ping rule. the Maritime Administration acted arbitrarily
and capnciously by failing to provide an adequate discus-
sion of the basis and purpose of the rule); see also United
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod, Co 568 F2d 240. 252
(2nd Cir. 1977) ("llf the judicial review which Congress
has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful,
the 'concise general statement of basis and purpose'
will enable us to see what maior issues of policy were
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the
agency reacted to them as it did.").
155. -See DEPARTMENT OF jusTIcE, ATroRNEY GENERAIS
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISMrATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947). see
also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v, Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U3. 519. 546-47 (1978)
inadequately identified why the change in sec-
tion 402.03 was even an issue being addressed.
Furthermore, the Final Rule did not explain in
any way why the language was amended. For
this reason, the statement was inadequate, and
the promulgation of section 402 03 violated sec-
tion 553(c) of the APA
Even though the Service failed to satisfy the
requirements of the APA when promulgating
section 402,03. any attack based on these pro-
cedural violations may be time-barred under the
general statute of limitations, which bars civil
actions against the United States not com-
menced within six years of the date when the
cause of action begins to accrue 157 The APA vio-
lations here occurred well over six years ago
Where regulations are challenged as exceeding
statutory authority, however, the six-year statute
of limitations does not apply.03 Thus, section
402.03 could be challenged as exceeding statu-
tory authority
V. Section 402.03 Is Not a Reasonable
Interpretation of Section 7(a)(2)
Section 402 03, which limits the applicabili-
ty of section 71aJ12) to agency actions where
there is discretionary involvement or control,
cannot be reconciled with the plain language of
section 7(a)12) that its requirements are applic-
able to "any action authorized, funded or carried
out" by a federal agency'" Furthermore, the
legislative history of the ESA makes it abun-
dantly clear that the ESA was intended to apply
(deferring to the Attorney General's Manual as an inter-
pretation of the APA because of the role the Department
of Justice played in drafting the APAJ
156 51 Fed Reg 19,926, 19,937 11986)
157 See28USC §2401iajl1994 5ee al;oStrahanv
Lmnnon, 967 F Supp 581, 607 (D Mass 19971 (holtng
policy-based challenge to section 40203 time-barrei
because brought over six years after promulgationi
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v Federal Emergency Management
Agency, II F Supp 2d 529, 546 n 24 (DVI 1998) (citng
Wind River Mining Corp v United States 946 F2d 710,
715 (9th Cir 199i11
158 See Haw&bill I I F Supp 2d at 546 n 24 (refer-
encing \VWind River 946 F2d at 712j
159 16 USC § 15361af12) 11994) (emphasis
addedj
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to all agency actions, regardless of the degree
of discretion possessed by the agency. The pro-
mulgation of section 402.03, therefore, exceed-
ed the Service's statutory authority and should
be invalidated in order to give effect to
Congress' intent that agencies insure, through
consultation with the Service, that any action
they take will not jeopardize the continued
existence of listed species or result in the mod-
ification of critical habitat.
When Congress enacted the ESA, it dele-
gated broad administrative and interpretive
power to the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce, who have in turn dele-
gated this authority to the Service. 160 In section
11 (f) of the ESA, the Secretary of Interior and
Commerce are "authorized to promulgate such
regulations as may be appropriate to enforce
this Chapter." 6i This language constitutes an
express delegation of authority to interpret the
provisions of the ESA.
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,162 the Supreme Court made it clear that
agencies are to be given a great deal of defer-
ence in interpreting their operative statutes
when such a delegation exists. The Court set
forth the framework for determining whether
an agency's construction of a statute is permis-
sible:
First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter, for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of
Congress. 163 If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at
160. See id. §§ 1533, 1540(f); 50 C.ER. § 402.01
(1998).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(f).
162. 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984).
163. The Court inserted a footnote at this point,
reading "[tlhe judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must relect administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear Iclongressional
intent. If a court, employing traditional rules of statutory
issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessa-y in the
absence of an administrative interpre-
tation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect' to tle issue,
the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute I64
The Court explained that the question is not
whether the agencys construction is appropri-
ate, but whether it is "reasonable' in the con-
text of the particular statutory provision) 65
Furthermore, an agency interpretation taken
pursuant to an express delegation is "given
controlling weight unless it is arbitrary, capri-
cious or manifestly contrary to the statute."16'
Given this framework, the question of
whether section 402.03 is a permissible con-
struction first depends on whetl'er Congress
expressed a clear intent when it directly spoke
to the applicability of section 7(ai(2). If it did,
the Service had no authority to alter Congress'
intent, and section 402.03 should be repealed
in order to give affect to thet intent. If
Congress' intent on the matter is deemed
ambiguous, however, the question becomes
whether the interpretation of section 7 applic-
ability found in section 402.03 is a reasonable
interpretation.
Following the Chevron analysis, the first
question is whether Congress spoke to the
matter at hand. 67 Here, the question is what
agency actions are sublect to section 7(a)(2)'s
mandate. Congress spoke directly to the issue
within section 7(a)(2) itself, by defining
"agency action" as "any action authorized,
funded or carried out" by a federal agency 168
The next question then, is whether
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention
on the precise question at issue, that Intention Is the law
and must be given effect" Id. at 843 n 9
164. Id, at 842-43.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 844.
167. Id. at 842.
168. 16 U.$.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)
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Congress' intent on the matter, as expressed in
the statutory language, is clear.169 If the intent
is clear, then the agency must give it effect. 70
In answering this question, it cannot be ignored
that the Supreme Court has already construed
the intent of Congress and stated that the lan-
guage of section 7 "admits of no exception."' 71
The Supreme Court further recognized that
"there are no exceptions in the [ESAI for feder-
al agencies."'7 2 Given the clarity of the language
"any action authorized, funded or carried out,"
the Supreme Court could not have reached any
other conclusion.
First, the term "any" is all-inclusive, it does
not have any limiting effect. Second, Congress'
choice of words to define the scope of action
indicates an intent that all agency actions fall
within the scope of section 7 Congress' use of
the words "authorized, funded or carried out"
makes it clear that if an agency is involved in a
given prolect in anyway, its actions will be sub-
lect to the requirements of section 7 This is
apparent by the fact that one would be hard
pressed to imagine an agency action taken
where there is federal involvement or control in
a given prolect that does not fall within the
range of actions covered by these three words,
Hence, the definition of section 7 appearing in
section 402.03 prior to 1986 read as: "Section 7
appljiesi to all actions in which there is
Iflederal involvement or control."17 3 The plain
language of section 7(a)(2) leaves no room for
exceptions, indicating that the intent of
Congress in enacting the ESA was to sublect all
agency actions to the requirements of section
7, regardless of the degree of discretion held by
that agency. Given the clarity of the statutory
language, the Service exceeded its statutory
authority by exempting nondiscretionary
actions from the requirements of section
7(a)(2). As such. section 402.03 of the iOnt reg-
ulations should be relected under the first step
169. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
170. See id.
171. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S 153,
173 (1978).
172. Id. at 188. Following the Hill decision,
Congress did amend the ESA to include a process where-
by agencies could receive an exemption by petitioning the
of the Chevron analysis as contrary to congres-
sional intent expressed in the plain language of
section 7(a)(2)
Even though the language of section 7(a)(2)
seems to encompass every imaginable agency
action, it could still be argued that it is not clear
whether Congress intended that it apply to
nondiscretionary agency actions, Under this
view, one would ask how Congress could possi-
bly have intended that agencies carry out the
mandate of the ESA when the agency does not
even possess the authority to take such
actions? Under this reasoning, and because
Congress did not speak directly to the issue of
discretion, section 7(a)(2) could be found to be
ambiguous, If it is ambiguous, the next ques-
tion under the Chevron analysis is whether the
Service's interpretation of section 7(a)1 2) is rea-
sonable. If the Service's interpretation is read
consistent with the underlying purposes of the
ESA and its legislative history, then it is a rea-
sonable interpretation and a court must give
deference- If it is not reasonable, then it must
be invalidated as contrary to congressional
intent, A close examination of the underlying
purposes of the ESA and its legislative history
reveal a clear congressional intent that section
7 is meant to apply to all agency actions.
regardless of whether the agency possesses
only nondiscretionary powers,
In Hill, the Supreme Court conducted a
searching probe into the legislative history of
the ESA' 74 The Court concluded that the "lan-
guage, history, and structure of the IESAI indi-
cate beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest
of priorities-" 175 In addition, the Court stated
that the -plain intent of Congress in enacting
Ithe ESAI was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the
cost "176 The Court noted that the clarity of the
statutory language made a search of the leg-
newly created Endangered Species Committee See 16
USC §§ 1536(ejihj
173 50CFR §4020311998j
174- 437 US at 174-88
175 ld at 184
176 ld
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islative history unnecessary to reach its conclu-
sion that the language of section 7 "admits of
no exception." 177 The Court, however, did
engage in a searching evaluation of the legisla-
tive history in order to rebut the dissenting
opinion's assertion that the malority's result
was not in accord with congressional intent. 178
The Court began by looking at legislation for
species protection in place prior to the ESA of
1973.179 The Court emphasized that the ESA of
1966 and the Endangered Species Conservation
Act (ESCA) of 1969 both contained qualifying
language in its mandates to federal agencies
and that this language had been omitted when
Congress enacted the ESA of 1973.180 The 1966
Act provided that all federal agencies should
protect species "insofar as is practicable and
consistent with thelirl primary purpose."'8' This
limiting language was also found in the 1969
Act.182 The Court also pointed out that every bill
introduced into Congress in 1973 contained
similar qualifying language. 183 However, the bill
that originally passed the House, House
Resolution 37 , and the final language of section
7 carefully omitted this qualifying language. 84
The House Committee Report accompany-
ing House Resolution 37 stated:
This subsection requires the Secretary
and the heads of all other [flederal
departments and agencies to use their
authorities in order to carry out pro-
grams for the protection of endangered
species, and it further requires that
those agencies take the necessary
action that will not leopardize the con-
tinuing existence of endangered species
or result in the destruction of critical
habitat of those species. 185
177 See id. at 173.
178. See id. at 174-88.
179. See id. at 174-80.
180. See id. at 182.
181. Endangered Species Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 926.
repealed, 87 Stat. 903.
182. Endangered Species Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275,
repealed, 87 Stat. 903.
The qualifying language was omitted. However,
the bill that passed the Senate, Senate Bill 1983,
retained the qualifying language."I '
Ultimately the issue went to the Conference
Committee for resolution, ThE, Conference
Report explained that the Committee adopted
Senate Bill 1983 for the most part but that it
relected the Senate version of section 7 and
adopted the mandatory language of House
Resolution 37, which excluded the qualifying
language. 187 Emphasizing this chain of events,
the Supreme Court concluded that,
the legislative history undergirding sec-
tion 7 reveals an explicit congressional
decision to require agencies to afford
first priority to the declared national
policy of saving endangered species
The pointed omission of the type of
qualifying language previously included
in endangered species legislation
reveals a conscious dec sion by
Congress to give endangered species
priority over the "primary missions" of
federal agencies. 188
The Supreme Court's search of the legisla-
tive history makes it clear that Congress intend-
ed the ESA to impose upon all agencies man-
dates that are in addition to and with priority
over those mandates contained in the agencies'
operative statutes. Moreover, by explicitly omit-
ting all qualifying language, Congress expressed
a clear intent that all agency actions shall be
subject to the requirements of section 7, regard-
less of the degree of discretion possessed by the
agency. To read otherwise would go against the
stated purpose of the ESA-"Io provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species
183. Hill. 437 U.S at 181
184. See id. at 182
185. Id. at 182-83 (quoting H.R REP No. 93-412
(1973)).
186. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 182
187. See id. at 183 (citing H.R CONF REP No 93-740
(1973)).
188. Hill. 437 U S. at 185
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depend may be conserved" and "to provide a
program for conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species."'8 9 It would
also run contrary to the stated policy of the
ESA that "all Iflederal departments and agen-
cies seek to conserve endangered species
and threatened species."'190 "Conserve" is
defined by the ESA as: "to use and the use of
all methods and procedures which are neces-
sary to bring endangered species or threat-
ened species to the point at which the mea-
sures provided pursuant to this chapter are
no longer necessary."' 9' In sum, the Supreme
Court was correct in reading Congress' intent
when it stated that section 7 "admits of no
exception."
In addition, the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of section 7 in Hill and its reading of the
congressional intent behind section 7 were
subsequently affirmed by Congress in its 1978
amendment to the ESA. Congress' primary
purpose in amending the ESA was to address
the apparent inflexibility of the ESA by estab-
lishing the Endangered Species Committee to
review certain actions for determining
whether exemptions should be granted, 12
Two bills, House Resolution 14104 and Senate
Bill 2899 were at odds, and the issue went to
the Conference Committee for resolution '9
In explaining why the Senate version of sec-
tion 7 was adopted, which contained identical
language as its predecessor, the Conference
Report states that "[tlhe conferees felt that
the Senate provision by retaining existing law,
was preferable since regulations governing
section 7 are now familiar to most Iflederal
agencies and have received substantial inter-
pretation."194 Given that Congress was well
aware of the Supreme Court's decision in Hill.
this statement affirms the Court's reading that
section 7 was intended to apply to all agency
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
190. Id. §} 1531(c)(1).
191. ld. § 1532(3).





This conclusion is further supported by
the fact that the final 1978 amendment con-
tained the House version of an exemption
process to be carried out by the Endangered
Species Committee _Vs This exemption
process provides that in order for an agency
to be excused from its obligations under sec-
tion 7 it must obtain an exemption from the
Endangered Species CommitteeiQ The
House Report accompanying the House bill
provided a full discussion of the Hill decision
and its implications The Report states that
"evidence developed at hearings suggests
that the consultation process can resolve
many if not most of the conflicts that might
develop under the Act "' Furthermore, the
Report states that "lilt is clear,, nevertheless,
that there will continue to be some [flederal-
ly authorized activities which cannot be mod-
ified in a- manner which will avoid a conflict
with a listed species -I' Finally. the Report
explains that the committee decided "that
some flexibility is needed in the Act to allow
consideration of those cases where a If ederal
action cannot be completed or its oblectives
cannot be met without directly conflicting
with the requirements of Section 7 "1 As
explained in the House Report, the means for
achieving this flexibility was the exemption
process and the Endangered Species
Committee 2 ,) Aside from the exemption
process, the 1978 amendments retained the
stringent mandate of section 7 Moreover,
Congress has amended the ESA three times
since 1978, and each time it has explicitly
retained the mandatory language of section
7(a)(2) I
In light of the above discussion appearing
in both the House and Conference Reports,
and the fact that Congress has retained the
I96 See 16USC § 1536fej




201 StepieraffyA:tafDec 28, 1970 PL 96-159 93
Stat 1226 Act ot 01t 3 1982 PL 97-304, 96 Stat 1426,
Act of Nov 23 1988 PL 103-707 102 Stat 4709
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language of section 7(a)(2) to this day, it is
clear that the congressional intent underlying
section 7(a)(2) is that all agency actions are
subject to the requirements of section 7 and
that any exception to section 7(a)(2) require-
ments must come as a result of the exemption
process. No discussion of the discretionary
character of an agency's mandate appears any-
where in the legislative history. The exception
to section 7(a)(2) requirements provided by
section 402.03 of the joint regulations for non-
discretionary agency actions, therefore, is
clearly at odds with Congress' intent. As such,
the Service's interpretation of the applicability
of section 7(a)(2) may be construed as unrea-
sonable, making section 402.03 vulnerable to
invalidation as exceeding statutory authority.
VI. Implications of Removing Section
402.03 from the Analysis
Given that section 7(a)(2) of the ESA was
not intended to be limited to discretionary
agency action, the cases discussed in Part III
relied upon section 402.03 in error. No evalua-
tion of the discretionary character of agency
action is permissible under section 7(a)(2),
which precludes such an evaluation from serv-
ing as a threshold question for determining the
applicability of its mandates. The question
then is: what should the analysis have been in
those cases and did the courts reach the cor-
rect result?
In Strahan, the court was faced with a situa-
tion where an agency's operative statute man-
dated the agency to carry out specific actions
under specific and limited criteria that did not
allow for any consideration of species protec-
tion. With section 402.03 removed from the
analysis, the court should have, as a threshold
matter, determined whether the Coast Guard's
202. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998) (emphasis added).
203. See generally Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Solomino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); United States v. Smith, 499
U.S. 160 (1991); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439
(1987); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987);
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (198 1); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439
(1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939);
licensing and certification of vessels fell within
the definition of "agency action" under section
7(a)(2). "Agency action" is defined under sec-
tion 7(a)(2) as "any action authorized, funded
or carried out" by a federal agency. The Coast
Guard's licensing and certification of vessels
authorize sea vessels to operate within the
Coast Guard's lurisdiction, clearly an "agency
action" under section 7(a)(2). In addition,
"action" is further defined under sE ction 402.02
of the joint regulations as "all activities or pro-
grams of any kind authorized, funded or carried
out, in whole or in part, by Ifledcral agencies
Examples include the granting of
licenses."202 The Coast Guard's licensing activi-
ties clearly fall within this definition. The court
in Strahan, therefore, should have concluded
that section 7(a)(2) does apply to the Coast
Guard's licensing and certification actions
This does not mean that the Strahan court
should have simply ignored the limitations
placed upon the Coast Guard under its opera-
tive statute. Rather, instead of looking to the
discretionary nature of the Coast Guard's
actions, the court should have analyzed the
problem under the doctrines governing the
implicit repeal of congressional acts.2 03 Where
Congress has explicitly repealed a statute's
mandate, there is no question tl'at repeal is
final. 204 In the case where Congress has not
provided an explicit repeal and two congres-
sional enactments prove to be irreconcilable,
repeal by implication may be prEsent If two
statutes are irreconcilable, the congressional
act that is later in time will override the prior
congressional act.205 However, it is a "'cardinal
rule that repeals by implication are not
favored."'206 In order for a court to find repeal
by implication, there must be a clear and man-
ifest showing of congressional intent to
repeal. 207 In addition, "when two statutes are
Wood v. United States, 16 Pet 342 (1842)
204. See Mancan, 417 U S at 551
205. See id., Rodnguez, 480 U S. at 524; WaLt, 451 U S
at 266.
206. Mancan, 417 U.S, at 549 (quoting Posadas v
National City Bank, 296 U S 497, 503 (1030)).
207. See Rodriguez, 480 U.S at 524 (holding that
repeals by implication will not be found uilless an intent
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capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent expressed congressional,intent
to the contrary, to regard each as effective."2M
Only where two statutes prove to be irreconcil-
able is repeal by implication justified.209
It has been shown that the intent of
Congress in enacting the ESA was to direct
agencies to place the protection of threatened
or endangered species above its primary mis-
sions. Thus, any statute passed prior to the
enactment of the ESA in 1973 that proves to be
irreconcilable with the later mandate of the
ESA will be repealed by implication because
Congress has expressed a clear and manifest
intent to do so. For statutes passed after the
enactment of the ESA, a clear expression of
congressional intent to repeal the mandates of
the ESA must be shown in order to find an
implicit repeal of the ESA. An example where
Congress has shown such intent can be found
in the Salvage Logging Law,210 exempting the
preparation, advertisement, offer, award and
operation of any salvage timber sale for the
period between July 27, 1995 to September 30,
1997 Absent an express repeal of the ESA's
requirements, however, a repeal of the ESA by
implication may not be possible due to the fact
that sections 7(e) through 7(h) of the ESA pro-
vide a mechanism for obtaining an exemption
from section 7(a)(2)'s mandates by way of peti-
tion to the Endangered Species Committee.2ii
Even where a statute enacted subsequent to
the ESA contains directives that may be
deemed irreconcilable with the ESA, Congress
has explicitly provided a means for solving
such conflicts in the form of the Endangered
Species Committee. Thus, an operative statute
containing specific directives that leave the
agency with no authority to consider species
to repeal is clear and manifest); Wait, 451 U.S. at 267 (The
intention of the legislature to repeal must be 'clear and
manifest."') (quoting Borden, 308 U.S. at 198).
208. Mancan, 417 U.S. at 551.
209. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill. 437 US 153,
190 (1978) ("in the absence of some affirmative showing
of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justifica-
tion for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and
later statutes are irreconcilable.'); Astoria Fed, Say &
Loan Ass'n v. Solomino, 501 U.S. 104. 109 (1991)
('lLlegislative repeals by implication will not be recog-
protection is irreconcilable with the ESA and
should not operate to repeal the ESA by impli-
cation. Moreover, this reading is consistent
with the purposes of the ESA in directing agen-
cies to give species protection the highest of
priorities In addition, courts have a duty to
read two conflicting statutes in a manner that
will give them both effect In Strahan, whether
the Coast Guard's operative statute was enact-
ed prior to or after the passage of the ESA, the
court had a duty to hold the Coast Guard to the
mandates of section 7(a)(2), In this respect, the
Strahan court reached the wrong result
In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a similar situation as in Strahan in that the
BLM's authority to grant a right-of-way was
limited.212 The court found that the BLM's
authority was limited not by its operative
statute but under contract with a private enti-
ty,2 3 For this reason, the doctrine of repeal by
implication would not have been applicable
The Sierra Club court erred in its analysis by
exempting the BLM's right-of-way grant from
section 7(a)(2) as nondiscretionary agency
action Instead, the court should have conclud-
ed that the right-of-way was an "agency action"
under section 7(a)(2) because it was an action
"approved" by the BLM,214 Also, section 402,02
of the Service's joint regulations specifically
includes 'the granting of rights-of-way" as
an example of an "action" under section
7(a)(2) 215 Thus, the court should have held
that the BLM's granting of a right-of-way was
subject to section 7(a)(2) and that the BLM
was required to consult with the FWS concern-
ing the grants.
In addition, the court could have settled
the issue concerning the conflict between the
right-of-way agreements and the ESA by look-
nized, insofar as two statutes are capable of coexistence,
'absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to the
contray") (quoting Mancan, 417 U S at 551
210 Pub L No 104-191995j
211 16USC § 1532il9941
212 65F3dat 1509
213 See id at 1509-10
214 16USC § 1536aj211i994)
215 50CFR §402 0211998
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ing to the sovereign acts doctrine. When the
United States enters into a contract, it will be
bound like any other private party.2 16 As such,
"'[wihen the United States enters into contract
relations, its rights and duties therein are gov-
erned generally by the law applicable to con-
tracts between private individuals."' 21 7 For this
reason, the United States, as a party to a con-
tract, is excused from contractual performance
when that performance is precluded by a pub-
lic and general act of the sovereign.2 18 This is
the "sovereign acts doctrine" and it "is part of
every contract with the government, whether
the contract explicitly provides for it or not."21 9
Even though it can be said that all government
action is enacted for the good of the public,
however, not every act of the government qual-
ifies as a sovereign act within the meaning of
this doctrine. Rather, only those "public and
general acts as a sovereign" qualify. "[Glovern-
ment action whose principle effect is to abro-
gate specific contractual rights does not
immunize the government from contractual
liability under the doctrine."220 The ESA's prin-
ciple effect is not to abrogate specific contrac-
tual rights, but rather, to protect the public's
general interest in conserving threatened and
endangered species. 221 The BLM, therefore,
should have been held to its mandate under
the ESA, and any obligations the BLM had
under the right-of-way agreement should have
been excused to the extent that they conflict-
ed with its legal obligations under the ESA.
The Marbled Murrelet cases pose an inter-
esting situation. In those cases, the Ninth
Circuit found actions taken by the FWS to be
outside the scope of section 7(a)(2) because
they were nondiscretionary actions of an advi-
sory nature and the FWS had no authority to
influence the actions of the private parties. By
216. See United States v. Winstar Corp.. 518 U.S.
839 892 (1996); Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458,
461 (1925)
217 Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 895 (quoting Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)).
218. See Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461.
219. Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United
States, 998 F.2d 953, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
220. Winstar Corp. v. United States. 64 F.3d 1531,
relying on section 402.03 to find the FWS's
actions outside of the scope of "agency action"
subject to section 7(a)(2), the cou't erred in its
analysis. Instead the court should have ana-
lyzed whether the actions taken by the FWS
constituted "agency action" as defined under
section 7(a)(2). Under this definition, the court
could have easily concluded that the FWS's
on-site inspections, advisory letters and con-
currence letters were "actions carried out" by a
federal agency and thus subject to section
7(a)(2). The court, however, concluded that
since the FWS had no authority to enforce the
conditions set forth in the letters or to direct-
ly influence the private or state entities'
actions through the assertion of its authority,
the FWS had no discretionary authority and
was therefore exempt from sect on 7(a)(2)'s
mandates. 222 Because the court rElied on sec-
tion 402.03 to reach its holdings, its conclu-
sions are analytically flawed.
It must be pointed out, however, that a
number of compelling policy concerns under-
lying the Ninth Circuit's position lend toward
concluding that the decisions reached practi-
cal results despite the flawed aialysis. The
district court that denied the Marbled Murrelet
plaintiffs' motion for a TRO pointed out these
policy concerns in describing the relationship
between the FWS and the state agencies:
These facts depict three cash-strapped
agencies, in an era of streamlining and
budget cutting, working together to
avoid wasting valuable time and
endeavoring to gain optimurr use of
scarce resources as they try to protect a
threatened species from commercial
logging activity on thousands of acres
of private property. Such federal-state
1548 (Fed. Cir 1995) (citing Everett Plyvood Corp v.
United States, 651 F.2d 723, 731-32 (Ct. CI, 1981)). see also
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F2d 786, 817 (Ct. CI.
1978),
22i. 16 U.Sc. § 1531(a)(3) (1994) (oroviding that
species threatened with extinction "are of esthetic, eco-
logical, educational, historical, recreational, and scientif-
ic value to the Nation and its people")
222. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
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cooperation should be encouraged.
Service officials must be able to furnish
to their California counterparts infor-
mation, guidance, and technical and
legal advice. This assistance must be
permitted to flow among the agencies
freely, fully, and without fear that their
good faith efforts to protect endan-
gered or threatened species will be the
subject of litigation 223
In addition, if the FWS was required to consult
on every action it takes in advising private par-
ties or states concerning the effects a project
may have on endangered species, the ability of'
the FWS to aid others in identifying measures
that could be employed for protecting species
would be inhibited. This concern is, of course,
an important one, not only for efficiency rea-
sons but also for the effective protection of
threatened or endangered species.
While the lower court's analysis should
have excluded any consideration of the discre-
tionary character of the FWS's actions, the ulti-
mate dismissal of the plaintiff's claims may
have occurred anyway. In March 1997. after the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Marbled Murrelet I but
before the court's decision in Marbled Murrelet !1.
the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Bennett v. Spear 224 In this
decision, the Supreme Court held that section
1 I(g)(1)(A) of the ESA, which authorizes any
person to bring suit to enjoin any person,
(including government agencies), alleged to be
in violation of any provision of the ESA, does
not apply to alleged violations committed by
the FWS or the NMFS. 225 The Court pointed
out, however, that a suit could be brought
under the APA to review the actions of the
Service and that if those actions are found to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion.
or otherwise not in accordance with the law,
they will be set aside.226 The Court also point-
ed out that review under the APA can only be
obtained where there is "final agency action."
223. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt. 1996 WL 532112.
at *4.
224. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
225. See id. at 172-73.
which is determined by asking whether the
agency action consummates the agency's deci-
sionmaking process and whether "'rights or
obligations have been determined' or from
which 'legal consequences will flow.'"227
Given the Supreme Court's holding in
Bennett, the claims brought against the FWS in
the Marbled Murrelet cases alleging that the FWS
was in violation of section 7(a)(2) for failing to
initiate internal consultation should not have
proceeded under the ESA's citizen suit provi-
sion, but rather under the APA if they had been
brought under the APA. the relevant question
would have been whether the FWS's actions
were final agency actions, It is clear that the
FWS did not consummate any decisionmaking
process when it offered advice to the lumber
companies on how they could avoid a take
Even if these advisory actions were deemed to
consummate the agency's decisionmaking
process, there are no rights or obligations cre-
ated by them and no legal consequences will
flow from them With respect to the FWS's con-
currence letters provided to the lumber com-
panies, however, the issue may not be so clear.
It could be argued that the concurrence letters
consummated a decisionmaking process
aimed at determining what conditions should
be imposed to avoid a take Furthermore, the
lumber companies submitted these concur-
rence letters to the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Prevention ICDF) who, in
turn. considered them sufficient to comply
with California law Thus, a legal consequence
flowed from the concurrence letters in that
they constituted compliance with a state law.
An interesting aspect of the Supreme
Court's holding in Bennett is that by forcing
review of the Service's actions under the APA,
the Supreme Court has limited review of the
Service's compliance with section 7(a)(2) to
final agency actions only In this sense, the pol-
icy concerns of the Ninth Circuit and the lower
court policy concerns about forcing the Service
into internal consultation for an abundance of
226 Seeid at 175
227 Id at 178 (quoting Port of Boston Marine
Terminal Ass n v Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U S 62, 71 (1970)
Spnng 1999
Derek Weller Volume 5, Number 3
ministerial actions would be satisfied without
having to rely on the exception for nondiscre-
tionary agency action provided by section
402.03. The policy concerns favoring federal-
state agency cooperation and sharing of infor-
mation and advice would also be met.
In addition to the implications presented
with respect to the above cases, the invalidity
of section 402.03 has future implications as
well. Agencies are still mandated to insure its
actions are not likely to leopardize listed
species or their habitats. In order to meet this
mandate, agencies are also required to enter
into consultation if it is determined that their
actions may leopardize a species. If an agency
has relied on the exemption provided by sec-
tion 402.03 to decide that a given action is out-
side of the mandate of section 7(a)(2), it may
be sublect to liability under the general take
prohibition of section 9 if that action results in
a take of a listed species. The agency will be
without the "safe harbor" provided by the inci-
dental take statement that follows from the
consultation process. In addition, an agency
that has incorrectly determined that its action
is exempt may be sublect to a citizen suit
action enjoining its prolect for failure to satis-
fy its obligations under section 7(a)(2).
Agencies relying on section 402.03 will need to
reevaluate their responsibilities under the ESA
and insure that all their actions meet the strin-
gent mandate of section 7(a)(2), regardless of
whether those actions are discretionary or
nondiscretionary.
VII. Conclusion
Section 402.03 of the joint regulations,
promulgated by the Service in 1986, excuses
nondiscretionary agency actions from the man-
date of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. It is
absolutely clear that this regulation was pro-
mulgated in direct violation of the APA. At no
time was the public or any other interested
person given an opportunity to comment on
the possibility of exempting nondiscretionary
actions. It is also clear from the legislative his-
tory that Congress did not intend to exclude
nondiscretionary actions from section 7(a)(2)'s
mandate and that any exception must come
about through the exemption process.
Furthermore, by excluding certain actions, sec-
tion 402.03 runs contrary to the underlying
purposes of the ESA to conserve threatened
and endangered species.
The cases that have applied section 402.03
are limited, and section 402.03's impact has
not been felt in a large degree. If, however, sec-
tion 402.03 becomes rooted in the law, the
result will be an increase in litigation over
whether or not an agency action is nondiscre-
tionary and exceeding the scope of "agency
action" found to be exempt from section
7(a)(2)'s protective measures. This latter result
may have grave consequences for those
species whose existence depends on the ESA's
protective measures. On the othei hand, if sec-
tion 402.03 is invalidated, these species will
receive the protection they need. In addition,
an invalidation of section 402.03 may sublec[
agencies that have relied on it in the past to
find their actions exempt from section 7(a)(2)
to future litigation over the matter. On this
same point, agencies currently evaluating their
responsibilities under the ESA should be
aware that reliance on section 402.03 might
leave them in a vulnerable position.
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